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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF

UTAH

GARY KENDRICK, Inc., dba
GARY'S DRYWALL and PETERSON
GLASS COMPANY,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.

RESPONDENTS'' BRIEF
Civil No.

15995

GENE W. MILLER and RUTH B.
MILLER,
Defendants and
Respondents.

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action by Plaintiff to recover for labor and
materials supplied to Defendants under Sections 14-2-1, Utah
Code Annotated, 1953 as amended.
DISPOSITION OF THE CASE IN LOWER COURT
The lower court barred Plaintiff-Appellant '_s recovery
of $1309.00 of the total-amount claimed by reason of a
receipt and lien release executed by Plaintiff-Appellant.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendants-Respondents ask this Court to sustain the
findings and decision of the lower court which barred PlaintiffAppellant from recovering $1309.00 of the total amount
claimed.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendants-Respondents agree with the statement of
facts in Plaintiff's brief with the following additions:
There was a practice of dealing between Plaintiff and
Laron Wardle whereby the Plaintiff issued lien releases
Wardle with authority to complete them.

~

(Tr. p. 22, line

15-20 and also Tr. p. 23, lines 23-25 and p. 24, line 1-lli.

Plaintiff understood that the purpose of the lien releae
was to evidence receipt of payment and for releasing
claim by the Plaintiff on the home of the Defendants.

a~

(Tr.

p. 24, lines l2-25).
The lien release in question was presented to Defendant
Bank for payment on the Plaintiff's home and the bank honw
it. (Tr. p. 35, lines 11-12, also Tr. p. 32, lines 7-23).
The contractor had three jobs going at the same time.
(Tr. p. 30, lines 15-17)

Plaintiff was aware of the fact

the contractor was working on more than one job. (Tr. P· lC
1 ines 23-25) •

ARGUMENT
The District Court for Cache County properly ruled that
where the Plaintiff issued to the contractor lien releans
in blank and gave authority to the contractor to compleU
the instruments and one of the releases was relied on by
Defendants' bank to make payments out of Defendants
the lien release was valid against the Plaintiff.
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The instant case is very similar to·the LeGrand Johnson
Construction Company v. Kennedy 541 P.2d 1038 case cited by
Plaintiff and relied upon by the lower Court.

Plaintiff

tries to distinguish the case on the basis of.the facts, but
they are really distinctions without any difference.

The

basic issue is whether the bank which was handling Defendant's
money was correct in relying on the lien release which was
submitted in making payments to Sundown Construction, the
Contractor.
It is undisputed that the contractor made it a practice
to obtain from the Plaintiff lien releases for obtaining
payments from lending institutions.

It is also undisputed

that the lien releases were executed in blank and the contractor
was given authority to fill in the blanks.

The lien waiver

in question was duly presented to Defendants' bank and the
bank relied upon the Plaintiff's signature in advancing
money to the contractor.

The Plaintiff clearly understood

the purpose of the lien release was to obtain money from the
bank holding the money and to release any lien rights which
could be claimed by Plaintiff.
In LeGrand Johnson Construction Company v. Kennedy,
supra, this court ruled that where there had been a practice
of dealing between the building contractor and the supplier
whereby the .supplier issued to the contractor lien waivers
and releases in blank and gave authority to the contractor
to complete the instruments and the supplier gave the contractor's
agent a blank lien release for the purpose of releasing any
claim of lien by the supplier on the construction of xhe
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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owner's structure, the lien waiver is valid.
Appellant's first attempt to draw a distinction betweer,
Johnson v. Kennedy, supra, and the present case is that the
contractor, in Johnson v. Kennedy failed to designate the
specific accounts for whj.ch the money should be applied,
Respondents contend this distinction is irrelevant in
particular case.

~~

It is clear Wardle, the con tractor, had

a:,

account with the materialman and that Plaintiffs knew of at
least two jobs because the other lien release on the Miller
home was executed by the Plaintiff's agent on the same date
(Exhibits 4 and 5).

It is also clear that

Plaintiff's~~

knew that the receipt and lien release would be used by the
contractor to get money from the lending institution holdinc
the owner's money.

(Tr. p.24, lines 12-15).

Under thee

circumstances it is basic agency law that Plaintiff should
bear the responsibility for the acts of the Contractor. 3 II
2nd "Agency" Section 76:

• • the rule is that where a principal has, by his
voluntary act, placed an agent in such a situation tha!
a person of ordinary prudence conversant with business
usages and the nature of the particular business is
justified in assuming that such agent has authoriey~
perform a particular act and deals with the agent upon
that assumption, the principal is estopped as again~
such third person from denying the agent's authoriey;
was, in fact, less extensive than that with which he
was apparetitly clothed.
This rule has been based ~m
the principle that were one of two innocent parties
must suffer from the wrongful act of another, the loss
should fall upon the one who, by his conduct created
the circumstances which enabled the third party to
perpetrate the wrong and cause the loss.
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The owner suffered as a result of .the contractors'
wrongdoings (Tr. pp.36-37 and p. 40, lines 4-16.) and Plaintiff
is now insisting the Defendant homeowners should pay twice
for the dry wall even though Plaintiff was the one who
signed the the receipt and lien release in blank.
Appellant maintains that Johnson v. Kennedy can be
distinguished on the facts in that Wardle, unlike the contractor
in Johnson v. Kennedy first paid in full the Stewart .Hill
Job with his own funds and received a lien release concurrent
therewith.

Although Appellant has correctly stated the

facts, the distinction is irrelevant to a third party.

The

essential element in Johnson v. Kennedy was -that the lien
waiver was presented to the Defendant's bank and the bank
relied upon the signature of the subcontractors in advancing'
the money obtained by the contractor.

The sequence of

events in the instant case does not change this basic similarity.
Appellant argues that the contractor in Johnson v. Kennedy
created an open account covering several jobs by letting
payments to suppliers go.

It is argued that Wardle paid his

bills prior to the time Plaintiff was to furnish labor and
materials to Defendant's home.
work done on two separate homes.
on the same day.

Exhibits 4 and 5 reflect
Both documents were executed

Respondents submit that Plaintiffs were

aware that Wardle was working on more than one job and knew
or should have known that what the Contractor actually di~
with the blank lien releases was possible, that is: a.blank
lien release could be presented to the wrong bank so the
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contractor could be paid twice.

The responsibility for such

an occurence should rest with the Plaintiff who was the 0 ~
who signed the lien release in blank.
Appellant attempts to distinguish the instant case froi
Johnson v. Kennedy in that Wardle paid for the lien releaH
before he submitted it to anyone else whereas in Johnson,
ot~r

the contractor first obtained lien waivers to obtain
jobs.

The fact of the matter is that the Plaintiff never

received the total amount owed from the contract on the jobs
he had going with the Plaintff, otherwise he would never
have filed an action under the bonding statute.

It

fol~n

that the money from Logan Savings and Loan which should have
gone to the Stewart Hill job never found its way there since

Defendant's money from First National Bank is what reirnburse1
the Contractor for his payment to the Plaintiff.
question again is:

The

Should the owner who relied on a receipt

signed by Plaintiff be held responsible for Plaintiff's
negligence in signing the receipt in blank?
Finally, it is argued that Wardle always paid for the
lien releases

~t

the

same~time

and that he designated the

job for which the payment was to be applied.

Appellants

point out that the contractor in Johnson made it a practi~
of obtaining lien releases for the purpose of obtaining
money from the lenders.

Respondents submit that Wardle has

not paid the full amount on Plaintiff's Exhibit 4, despite
the fact that the document reflected "payment in full."
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Appellants argue that the conduct of Wardle should not
operate as an estoppel to Plaintiff since the intention of
Wardle and Plaintiff was to release the Stewart Hill Job and
not the Defendants.

It is argued that while Wardle did

change the intent of the lien release, he did so without the
knowledge or intent of Plaintiff and therefore, he acted
beyond the scope of his authority.
Plaintiffs have admitted the validity of the signatures
on the lien releases.

The First National Bank of Logan knew

that the Plaintiffs were subcontractors on the Miller home
and that work was being done on the Miller home at that
time.

Once these facts were established, the bank's responsibilit

was ended.

See, 3 Am. Jur. 2nd, Agency, Section 76, supra .•

In Midwest Engineering and Construction Co. v. Compagna
(Mo.) 397 SW 2d 616, the court held that a party executing a
lien waiver will not be heard to assert its invalidity as
against an owner who has paid out money or otherwise changed
his position to his detriment in reliance upon the waiver.
Respondents ask this

court to compare the equities of a

subcontractor signing blank lien releases and then bringing
litigation against a defendant-owner who, according to the
record, had

already paid considerable money in addition to

the original loan for the construction of his home.
Plaintiff asserts that no consideration was received by
it for the lien release.

On the contrary, Plaintiff

received $1309.00 for signing the lien release.

The fact

that Plaintiff applied that money to a different account is
not Defendant's fault.

Plaintiff got $1309.00 for signing

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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since his money was disbursed on the basis of that signature,
·
Plaintiffs assert that knowledge, intention or

conse~

of the person entitled to lien is necessary to waive a lien,
The Plaintiff knew what a lien release was for.
lines 12-22)

(Tr. p. 24,

The language on the release itself is instructiv

"This receipt is executed and delivered by the unders~
to the corpora ti on to induce it to make payment to the
~ndersigned of the above st~ted sum from funds held ~
it for owner of above described real property and in
consideration thereof the undersigned hereby waives,
releases and discharged [sic) any lien undersigned hu
or may have against said real property."
Plaintiff most certainly intended to release a lien and
induce a lending institution to make payment.

The only

problem that arose was that the wrong bank disbursed the
money.

For Plaintiff to assert that it should not be held

responsible for the lien waiver it signed in blank is to
assert that a person should not be responsible for his check
which is signed in blank and given to someone else to fill
in.
Appellant argues that "while a lien release may be
executed releasing fully, all claims due and owing at the
time the lien release was given, it certainly cannot be
construed to apply to materials or labor supplied after t~
date of the

~elease."

53 Am Jur. 2d, Mechanic's Lien,. Sec.

293 is cited as authority for the argument.

Respondent does

not think this citation stands for the argument advanced.
The general rule is stated in 53

Am

Jur 2d, Mechanic's

Liens, Sec. 294:
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-9A release in general terms executed by mechanics
and materialmen operates to discharge the property from
their liens for work done and materials furnished
after, as well as before, its execution. Thus, in
construing a waiver given to facilitate a loan upon the
security of the lien and stating that the lienors nhave
waived and relinquished and do hereby waive and relinquish
all liens and claims of liens we now have or hereafter
may have" upon the land and buildings in question nfor
labor done and materials furnished for the construction
and erection of said building," it must be held that
the waiver was not only of the right to liens for "work
done", but also the right to liens for work done
and materials furnished subsequently to the date of
the waiver.
Townsend v. Barlow, 101 Conn 86, 124 A. 832, and Brown v. Will
120 Pa. 24, 13 A. 519 are cited as authority in other jurisdiction
Not only does the lien release refer to future liens
which may arise, but the authorities cited by appellant turn
on the question of consideration.

In Brimwood Homes, Inc.

v. Kundsen Builders Supply Co. 385 P2d 982, the reason the
lien waiver was not recognized with respect to future work
was that consideration was not received for the lien waiver.
In the instant case consideration was received when the
release was signed.

Also the fact situation is much more

similar to Johnson v. Kennedy, supra, than it is to the
Brimwood Homes, case.
A final argument advanced by appellants is that whatever the contractor did was outside the scope of his authority
and therefore should not operate to bar appellant's claim
for $1309.00.
conclusion.

Basic

agency law does not agree with this

See 3 Arn Jur 2d, Agency, Sec. 76. supra

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-10-

CONCLUSION
On June 1, 1978, the District Court in Cache County
allowed a se.toff of $1309 against Plaintiff's claim.

The

Court ruled that inasmuch'as the Plaintiff issued to the
general contractor lien waivers and releases in blank,

a~

gave them to the contractor to complete, the lien release in
question is valid against the Plaintiff.
This Court sustained the same court on a similar

set~

facts in October, 1975, by ruling in Johnson v. Kennedy,
supra, that where there had been a practice of dealing between
the building contractor and the supplier whereby the supplier
issued to the contractor lien waivers and releases in blank
and gave authority to the contractor to complete the instrume
and the supplier gave the contractor a blank lien release

i

for the purpose of releasing any claim of lien by the supplier
on the construction of the homeowner' s residence, the lien
waiver was valid.

The instant case comes within the ambit

of Johnson v. Kennedy and the lower Court's ruling should

'again

be sustained.
DATED this

13~h

day of October, 1978.
R~spectfulJ.y

Submitted,

HILLYARD, LOW & ANDERSON

Gar~~
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